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Information-Theoretically Secure Blind Authentication 
Codes without Verifier's Secret Keys * 
Noriyasu TAKEI, Yohei WATANABE and .Junji SHIKATA 
Abstract. In modern cryptography, information-theoretic security is 
formalized by means of some probability (e.g., success probability of adver-
sary's guessing) or some information-theoretic measure (e.g., Shannon en-
tropy), and the study on cryptographic protocols with information-theoretic 
security is one of effective applications of the probability theory, statistics, 
and information theory. In this paper, we study the blind authentication code 
(EA-code), a kind of information-theoretically secure authentication proto-
cols, in which verifier's secret keys are not required. For realizing it, we utilize 
a unidirectional low-bandwidth auxiliary channel which is called a manual 
channel. Specifically, in this paper we propose a model, a security definition, 
and a construction of EA-codes in the manual channel modeL Furthermore. 
we consider EA-codes in other models, i.e., the noisy channel model and the 
bounded storage model, in \Vhich no verifier's secret key is required. 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Background and Related Works 
In modern cryptography, there are two kinds of security settings, computational 
secuTity and infoTmat·ion-theoretic security ( a.k.a. unconditional sec11Tity). The 
former is based on the assumption of difficulty of computationally hard problems 
such as the integer factoring problem or the discrete logarithm problem in finite 
fields or elliptic curves. On the other hand, in generaL the latter is formalized 
by means of some information-theoretic measure (e.g., Shannon entropy) or some 
probability (e.g., success probability of adversary's guessing), and it intends to 
represent the security which is guaranteed against the adversary having unlimited 
infinite) computational resources. In particular, the security of information-
theoretically secure authentication protocols, which are dealt with in this paper, is 
formalized and analyzed success probability of the best strategy of adversary's 
attacks. In this sense, the study on cryptographic protocols with information-
theoretic security is one of effective applications of the probability theory, statistics, 
and information theory. 
The blind signature scherne is first introduced by Chaum [2]. Blind signature 
schemes allow a user to obtain a valid signature for a message from a signer such 
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that the message is secret for the . Therefore, it achif;ves to protect 
user'::, privacy, and can be u:oed for electronic voting and electronic cash scheme::;. 
In [10], Pointcheval and Stern proposed the first provably secure blind signature 
schemes by assuming ideal hC!sh functions. which is often called the random oracles. 
Furthermore. Juds et al. first blind signature schcrncc; without the 
random oraclet>. In the information-theoretic security setting, Hara et al. [5] iirst 
studied information-theoretically secure blind signature schemes. 
On the other hand. Pinkas [9] fir:::t mPntioned the idea of a blind messagt: 
authcnticatiou code (blind [AC), wl1ich i~ :;pecific to the shared (secret 
setting, >vhereas blind signature schemes are specific to the public key setting. Hara 
et al. also proposed blind MAC in the information-theoretic security setting, 
~which is called the blind o.ulhentication. code (BA-code for short). The model ofDA-
code::; is similar to that of information theoretically SE'cnrc blind signature schemes 
[5] except that EA-codes are designed such that only a single verifier can check the 
validity of an authenticated message. 
In [13], Vaudenay formalized a realistic communication model for message au~ 
rheHtication, in ,,-hich the sender and the receiver having no shared secret are L:on-
nected both a bidirectional insecure channel and a unidirectional low-bandwidth 
auxiliary channel. The low-bandwidth auxiliary channel enables the sender to man-
authenticate one c;hort string t.u the receiver. In the channel. the adversary 
cannot modify the short ~tring, hmvever. he can still read it, delm· it, and remove 
it. In [8]. 1\iaor et al. formally showed that authentication codes (A-codes for short) 
could be con:;tructed in this model \Vithout any secret information. They refer to 
the auxiliary channel as the mamw.l channel, and to this communication model as 
the manual channel model (MG\I for short). In recent years, the MCM is becoming 
in rcal-\vorld scenarios, for example. in a scenario where a person connects 
a ne-vv DVD to his home wireless network: Having him read a short 
on the display of the DVD player and type it on a PC's keyboard constitutes a 
manual authentication channel from the DVD player to the PC. This model is also 
suited to connect the two devices in a wireless network such as \Vircless USB nlH1 
Bluetooth. 
1.2. Our Contribution 
In information-theoretically secure cryptographic protocols including EA-codes 
and blind signature ~chemes [5j, all entities enrolled in the pro tu cols need to 
have secret keys, in general. For realizing it, it is often assumed that there is a 
trusted authority which generates secret keys of entities and securely distributes 
the keys to corresponding entities. This modd is often called a trusted initiali:;er 
nwdd (TI modd for ~11]. Hmvcver, the smaller the number of (mtities wbo 
need secret keys in the protocol becomes, the more practical the cryptographic 
protocol becomes, since generating and distributing secret keys in a secure way is 
nur an easy ta:ok in general. On the other hand. as mentioned above, we can realize 
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A-codes without any shared secret information (i.e., without the presence of TI) in 
the 1\ICJ\I. 
The goal of this paper is to stwly l3A-codes in which the number of entities IYho 
need secret keys is less than that of the I3A-codes in the TI model [4j. ::lpecifically, 
based on the idea of A-codes in the MC:.VI, we study BA-code~ in which a verifier 
can check the validity of any authenticated message without his secret key hy 
A-codes in the 1\IC:\L Since verifier ncccls no secret key, it enables a user ro 
arbitrarily select a verifier rluring the protocol, i.e., not necessary to determine a 
verifier before thP protocol starts. This property is useful in real-world applications. 
For example, we consider electronic cash as application of BA-codes in the MC:\L 
In that case. the user is n customer. the signer is a bank, and a verifier is a store. 
Then. a customer can select a store at any time in which he will use the electronic 
cash authenticated by the bank. and this situation is more convenient for customers 
in the real \vorld. 
In this paper, we propose a mocld and a :o;ecurity definition of EA-codes in the 
MCI\1. In addition, we provide a construction of BA-codes in the MCJ\I. and we 
show our construction satir;fies our security definition. Furthermore, we consider 
its extension: Based on the idea of our construction, we can obtain a generic 
construction of BA-codcs from any unconditionally secure commitm.cnt scheme 
and any A-code with no secret keys in a certain model, i.e., A-codes in the manual 
channel model (MC~I), A-codes in the noisy channel model (NCM) [14], and A-
codes in the bounded storage model (BSM) 
The rest of :;his paper is organized as folloYvs. In Section 2, we survey authen-
tication protocols with information-theoretic security: A-codes and BA-codes in 
the TI model, A-codes in the ~ICM. In Section 3, we propose a model, a security 
definition, and a construction of I3A-codes in the MCM. Furthermore. we consider 
.~cveral extension of our results. Finally, in Section 4, we give concluding remarks 
of the paper. 
2. Information-Theoretically Secure Authentication Protocols 
In this section, -vve survey information-theoretically secure authentication pro-
tocols. In the following, we assume the trusted initializer model (TI model) [11] 
for each protocol, if not otherwise mentioned. 
2.1. Authentication Code 
Authenticity (or integrity) is one of the fundamental and important crypto-
graphic functions, and authentication/signature schemes are usuallY used for pro-
,·iding this function. In particular, an authentication code (A-code for short) is the 
traditional authentication scheme with information-theoretic security. The A-code 
was originally proposed by Gilbert, McWilliams and Sloan [3], and later developed 
Simmons )2]. 
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In A-codes. there 21re t.hree a sender S, a receiver R and a tru:oted 
initializer TL A-codes are executed as follows. TI generates and distributes secret 
keys on behalf of S and R. The sender S generates an authenticator for a message 
using his o;ccret ke~·- In the moclel of A-codes (and all authentication protocols 
dealt with in tl1is paper). a pair of messages and authenticators is regarded as an 
authenticated message. Then, S sends the authenticated message to the receiver R 
over an insecure channel. Then, R checks the validity of the authenticated message 
using his secret kev. The formal rnodel of A -codes is as follmYe>. 
DEFINITION 1 (A-CODE). An av.thentication code (A-code for short) <I> in-
volves three entitie.s, TI, Sand R, and consi.sts of a three-tuple of algorithrn.s (Gen, 
Ver) u'ith three set.s, 2:; and E. where all of ulgorithm13 1xcept Gen 
an deterministic. <I> is e:recuted ·u.·dh three as follows. 
- Notation. 
- Entities: TI n tru.sted initializer. is a sender. and R is a r·eceiver. 
- Sets: i\.I is a .set of possible messages, I; is a set of possible authentica-
tors, o.nd E i.s a set of po.s.sible secret keys. 
- Algorithms: Gcn is o. _r]enero.tion algorithm ·which toJ.es a secv.TdiJ 
parameter as inp1tt o.nd o·utputs secret keys forS and R. rluth: iVI x E 't 
2:; is an authentication algorithm o.nd Ver: l'vf x E x E --+ { trv.e, false} 
is a 1Jcr4icatirm algorithm. 
1. Key Generation and Distribution by TI. TI generates a seer-cl key e E E 
joT S and R by using Gen. After distributing the key to S and R o1;cr secure 
channels, respectively, TI delete,o the key from his memory. Each of S and R 
keeps his o-wn secret key secret. 
2. Authenticator Generation. S gene-rates o.n authenticator CJ ·-
A.uth(m, e) E E for m E M by using his secr-et key F-. Then. 8 sends the 
o.uthr:n.hcuted message (m, to R ove·r an insecure channel. 
3. Verification. On receiving (m, CJ) from S, R checks the validity of (m, CJ) by 
using h-is secret key e. 1\!Iore precisely, if Ver(e, (m, CJ)) =true then R o.ccept.s 
(m, CJ) us valid, and rejects it other-wise. 
In the above definition, we require correctness, i.e., for all possible e E E and 
m E it holds that V er( e, (m., Auth(m, e))) = true. 
In A-cocks. for we assume the one-time model where it is allowed for 
the sender to generate an authenticator and to transmit an authenticated message 
only once; and the receiver is allowed to verify an authenticated message at most 
one time. 
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The security of A-codes is defined as the security against the following two types 
of attacks. 
1) Impersonation attack: An adv-ersary tries to impersonate the sender S by 
inserting an authenticated message into the channel betwE:en S and R, and 
he expects that will be Rccepted as valid by R. 
2) Substitution attack: An adversary tries to replace an authenticated messav,e 
generated by S -with a fraudulent authenticated nwssage, and he expects that 
it will be accepted as valid by R. 
In the impersonatiou the computatioually nnboundcd adversary selects 
a message with his best strategy such that the probability that it is accepted as 
valid by R becomes to be maximum; and in the substitution attack, the compu-
tatiormlly Ullbounded adv-ersary selects a fraudulent authenticated me::;sage with 
his best strategy such that it is accepted as valid by R becomes to be ma-ximum. 
Therefore, the security formalization is given in such a way that the sucresc; proba-
bility that R accepts a fraudulent authenticatPcl rnessagP created by the adversary 
is small enough. :More precisely, the security of A-codes is formally given as follows. 
DEYINITTO'-: 2 (SECURITY). Let <J) be an A-code. Then. <'I> is said to be t-
secure, if max{ P,r>,I, Pq,,s} <:=;: e, where P1>,1 and Pw,s are defined as follows. 
1) Impersonation attack: The odL·ersar-y t·ries to generate a fra·udulent !W-
thenticated message (m, a) that w-ill be accepted by the r-eceiver R. The success 
probability of this attack denoted by Pw.I is defined as 
PiJ>,I := ma.-x Pr(R accepts (m, a)), 
(m,cr) 
where ihe the p·robability is over random dwices of Gen. and thl:' rrwximitm 
is taken m; eT all possible authenttcated messages (m, a) E lvf x L 
Substitution attack: The: adversary can observe a transm.itted authent·icated 
message (m. a) which is correctly generated by the senderS, and then tries tu 
genemte a fmudulent authenticated message (m', a') with (m', a') =/=- (m, a) 
that unll be accepted by the recei1.·er· R. Tht S'Uccess probo.hility of this attack 
denoted by P,r>,s is defined as 
Pq, s := max max Pr(R accepts (m', a') ! (m, a)). 
' ('m, 1 rr) (rn 1 ,(Y1 )=j:.(rn.r;) 
where the probabil·ity is over random choices of Gen, and the maxim·urn is 
taken o uer all poss·ible authenticated messages a), (m', a') E Al x I: with 
(m, a)=/=- (m', a'). 
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It is well known that we can construct an A-code by using algebraic structures 
as follows. 
1. Gen. a security pnramct.pr P', it select:-; a prime power q with bit length 
f..l anci cm1structs the finite fidel with q elements. and it is denoted by GF(q). 
Then, it chooses a and b, uniformly at random from GF(q). Then, it outputs 
e := (a,b). In the following, we assume that all elements are encoded <:ls 
elements in 
2. Auth. For message m. and sender's secret 
and then ontputs the anthcnticator cr. 
e, it compute::> rT : = am+ b, 
3. Ver. For an authenticator er and a receiver's secret key e, it outputs true if 
er = am+ b holds, and otherwise outputs false. 
In the nhove construction, it is easily seen that. for all pos~ible e E E and 
m E A1, 1· (m, Auth(m, e))) = true. The of the abovP construction 
follows from the following proposition. 
PROPOSITION 3. The above constmction of A-codes is -)j-secure. 
2.2. Authentication Code in the Manual Channel l\ilodel 
Information-theoretically secure cryptographic protocols such ilS A-codes usu-
ally require secret information held by all entities enrolled in the protocols. By 
assuming the manual channel, Naor et al. [8] showed that A-codes could be con-
structed without any secret information. The manual channel is a unidirectional 
low-bandwirlth auxiliary channel, and only a verv short message can he authenti-
cally tran;;mittcd by the channel. ln other worcls, the adversary cannot insert or 
modify a short c;tring over the manual channel. ho,veH~r, he may still reacl it, delay 
it, or remove it in the manual channel. The manual channel model (MCM for short) 
[8] assumes that there are bidirectional insecure channels between a sender and a 
receiver and only one manual channel from the sender to the receiver. Formally, 
the model of A-codes in the i\ fC1\;I is defined as follows. 
DEFINITIOK 1 (A-CODE T.\J THE MCM). A k-round authent.im.tion code in 
the manual channel model (k-round A-code in the 1\!ICJVI) 11 involves two entities, S 
and R and consists of a two-tuple of algorithms (Auth, "Ver) with four finite sets, 
.1"\1, T, I: and f:, where all of algorithms are deterministic. n is executed with two 
phases as follow;;. 
- Notation. 
- Entities: S is a sender, and R is a receiver. 
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- Sets: lvf is a set of possible mrssages. :S is a set of possible anthen-
ticators. T is a set of possible tags, and E is a set of possible shorL 
strings. 
- Alt;orithms: A uth: T x :S --? E is an authenTication 2Jgorithm, and Ver: 
I: x f:-+ {true, false} a verihcation algorithm. 
1. Authenticator Generation. The protocol between a sender S and a re-
ceiver R consists of ( k - 1 )-round interactive communicc1 lions over insecure 
channels and only one comnmnication from S to R ovPr a manual channel. 
In the first round, S sends a message m. an authenticator cr1 and a tag t 1 
to R over the insecure channel: R sends only a tag t~ to S over the insecure 
channel. Then, both of Sand R create an authenticator (J2 := Auth(t 1 . cr1 ). 
After this, in the i-th round for odd i, S sendl:i only a tag t; to R over the 
insecure channel; R sends only a tag t; to S over the insecure channel. And 
in the .i-th round for even j. R sencls only a tag tj to S m·er the insecure 
channel; S sends a tag {1 to R over the insecure c:lmnnel. Then, both 
of Sand R inductively create an authenticator cri+1 := Auth(ti, cri) for every 
2 .::; i .S k- 1. Finally, after (k- 1)-round communications over the inse-
cure channels, iu the k-th round S sends a short string s to Rover a manual 
channel. 
2. Verification. R checks the validity of a message rn by using an authenticator 
(Jk and a short string s. More precisely. R accepts m as valid if and only if 
Ver( CTk, s) = true. 
The securit:- of A-codes in the J\ICM iei given as follws. 
DEFI:'-!ITION 5 (SECURITY [8]). Let D be a k-round A-code in the MG\I. 
Then, n is ~aid to be (n, A, k, e)-secure, if the following requirements are fulfiled, 
\\"here n is bit length of message:-;, ). is the capacity of the manual channel. and e 
is defined as follows. 
1) Correctness. For any message m, if there is no interference by the adversary 
in the exc;cudon, the receiver accept:o rn with probability at least 1/2. 
Furthermore, if the receiver R acceptl:i m with probability l, it is said chat D 
meets perfect correctness. 
2) Unconditional unforgeability. For any message m transmitted from the 
sender, any computationally unbounded ad-:ersary cannot replace m with a 
different message m' which will be accepted by the receiver R with probability 
larger than c. 
In particular, iJ n meets perfect correctness, it is said to be perfectly (n, A, k, c)-
secur-e. 
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Although the weak condition on correctness is considered in the a hove definirion 
(i.e., not nece8sarily perfect correctness), >ve note that we have always considered 
perfect correctness in the traditional A-code. Therefore, we also consider A-codes in 
the ::viCM which satisf\· perfect correctness in this paper. In addition. ·we note that 
the securitv of A-codes in the MCM is given ns the securitv against the substitution 
attack, and that of the impersonation attack is not considered. This is because the 
impersonation attack cannot be successful in principle, since there is a manual 
channel from the sender to the receiver R in the last transmission which nll 
impersonation attack ic; detectable. 
Next, we show a construction of A-codes in the ~ICM proposed in [8]. Here, 
suppose that a universal hash function io given as follows: let k he an odd integer. 
ancl the universal hash function is defined by Cx := 2.::7= 1 . In the 
following, u) denotes the concatenation of the strings u and v. 
1. Authentication Algorithm, Auth. In the first round, the senderS sends 
a message m to the receiver R. then R receives it as an authenticator m 
And, let an authenticator := m. Furthermore, S chooses a tag i~1 ) and 
sends it to R: R receives , chooses a tag i~J and sends it to S; S receives 
i~l, and compute:-; a authcnticator m~2 ) := (i~l, (m~1 J) + i~1 )); and R 
, th . . t 121 ( .(1) C ( (11) , c(l)) compntcs an au. ent1ca or 1nR := zR , i'·ll mR· -t- 18 . 
R 
After that, in the j-th round (2 :<::: j :<::: k- 1), S and R execute the protocol 
as follows. 
If j is odd, S chooses a and sends it to R: R receives . choose;,; a 
tag iW and sends it to S; S receives i~l, and computes a authenticator 
m~~+l) ·- (l}~). Ciu) Cm1!)) + i~-)): and R computes an authenticator 
R 
·- (rr/.J!)...:.. ~(.j)) 
'11 ' '8 . 
- If j is even, R chooses a tag and sends it to S; S receives i~l, chooses 
a tag and sends it to R receives i~l, and computcs an autlwn-
•i, .. \t·)r m(J.+IJ ·= (i(j) C (m(j)-.., ..L )·, S com1mtes an authenticator 
v .. '- ( , A R , S ' / R ) , 
m(j+lJ ·= (i(j) C ·· (m(j)) + ) 
8 . 8 ' i~) s . 
In thc k-th ronnel. S sends a short string to R oyer the manmtl channel. 
2. Verification Algorithm, Ver. For an authenticator m~) and a short string 
m~), it outputs true if m~") =m~), and otherwise outputs false. 
The security of the above construction is shown as follmvs. 
PROPOSITION 6 ([8]). The above construction of A-codes m the NICM is 
A, k, c)-secu.Te, where .k: 2: 3 is an odd integer. n is a interger, E E 1) 
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is a real number, and ).. = 2log ~ + 2log(k-l l n + 0(1). Here, log( i) x is the function 
obtained by repeating composition of log x i times. 
2.3. Blind Authentication Code 
vVe review the blind authentication code with information-theoretic security 
(EA-code for short), which is an information-theoretically secure authentication 
code with anonymity of mnssages, proposed Hara et al. [4]. 
Tn EA-codes, there are four entities, a signeT S, a user U, a verifier V, and a 
trusted initializer TI, and we assume that V is honest in the model. EA-codes 
are executed as follows. TI generates and distributes secret keys on behalf of S. 
U and V. C selects a nwssage, generates a hlinded message of the message, and 
then, he sends it to S. S generates an authenticator for the blinded message, and 
sends it back to U. Then, U creates an authenticator for the original message from 
the authenticator for the blinded message sent from S. In this modeL a pair of the 
message and the authenticator is regarded as an authenticated message. Then, U 
checks the validity of the authenticated message. If the authenticated message is 
valid, U sends it to V. Then, V checks the validity of the authenticated message. 
The formal model of EA-codes is given as follo-ws. 
DEFINITIO~ 7 (BA-CODE [4]). A blind authentication code (EA-code for 
short) II involves four entities, TI, S, U and V, and consists of a six-tuple of al-
gorithms (Gen, Blind, Sign, Unblind, UVer, VVer) with seven finite sets, AI, _M*, 
2.~ E*, Es. and , where all algorithrn.s except Gen are dctcrrniinistic. TI 
is executed with six phases as follows. 
-Notation. 
- Entities: TI is a trusted ·initializer S is a signer U is a user. and 1/ is 
a verifier. 
Sets: M is a set of possible messages, Jv!* is a set of possible blinded 
messages, E is a set of possible au.thcnticators messages, 2::* is a set 
of possible authenticators for blinded messages, Es i8 a set of possible 
signer's secret keys, Eu is a set of po88ible user's secret keys, and Ev 
i8 a set of possible verifier's secret keys. 
- Algorithms: Gen ·is a generatioTI. algorithm which takes a 8ecurity 
parameter a8 input and outp·uts secret key8 for S, U and V. Bz.ind: 1\II x 
Eu --+ AI* is a blinding algorithm, Sign: }vf* x Es --+ 2::* is a signing 
algorithm, Unbrind: 2::* x Eu --+ E is an unblinding algorithm, UVer: 
!'vi x E x Ec --+ {true. false} is a verification algorithm. for· the user, 
VVer: Nf x E x Ev --+ {true, false} is a verification algorithm for the 
verifier. 
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1. Key Generation and Distribution by TI. TI generates secret e8 E 
Es J eu E n'u) and Cv E Ev fors, U, and F, respectively, by using Gen. After 
distributing these secret over secure channels, respectively, TI deletes 
them from h,is memory. S, U and V keep their secret keys secret, respectively. 
Blinding. For a rne.'i8age m E U gen.em.tes a blinded message rn* := 
Blind( m, en) E AI* by using his key eu. Then, U sends m* to S. 
J. Authenticator Generation. On receiv·iny rn* from U, .s· genemtes an au-
thenticator 6* := , e8 ) E 'S* for m* 't.tsing his secret key e,. Then, 
S sends 6* to U. 
4. Unblinding. On rcceir.'ing an avthenticatoru* of m* .from S, U can create an 
a?tthentimtor 6 :=, Unl!lind( 6*, E I: for the original rncssage m by using 
his secret key en. Then, (m, u) is regarded as an authenticated message. 
5. Verification by U. On generating (m, 6) .from (m*, (J*), U checks the valid-
ity of c;- m by his secret key eu. M ore precisely. if UVer{m .. rT. eu) = 
trv.e then U accepts (m, (J) as valid. and rejects it otherwise. If (m, u) is 
valid, (m, (J) is regarded as a legal authenticated message, and U transmits 
(m, u) to V. 
6. Verification by V. On (m, (J) fmrn U, F checks the validity of 
6) by using his secret key ev. NI ore precisely, if VVer'(m. 6, ev) = true 
then V accept.s (m, (J) as valid, and rejects it otherwise. 
In the aboYf: definition, ,,-e require correctness of EA-codes, i.e., for all possible 
eu E EL', ee E Es, ev E Ev and m. E NI, it holds that 
Ul(~r(m, Unblin.d(Sign(Blind(m, e11 ), 
~~Ver(rn, U n./;/ind(Sign(Blind(m, 
, eu), e,) = true, 
), eu), c,.) =true. 
As in ~4], we consider a one-time model of EA-codes where the signer is allowed 
ru generate and transmit an authenticated message only once, and each of the user 
and the verifier i~ allow1'cl to verify cHI anthenticatecl message only once. 
Next, we explain the security definition of BA-coc1cs. 
DEFINITIOK 8 (SEC1:R.lTY [4]). Let IT be a BA-code. Then, IT said to 
be E-secure, if max(Pn,F, Pll.D, Prr,B) _ E, where Plr,F, Pn.D, Pn,B an defined as 
follows. 
1) Unconditional unforgeability. The notion of unconditional unforgmbility 
means that it is for a dishonest user U to succeed in impersonation or 
substitution attacks by creating a fraudulent a·athenticated message. We de-
fine Pn,F as Pu.F := max(Pn,Fr, Pn,Fs). where Pn,Fr and Pn,Fs are success 
Information-Theoretically Secure EA-Codes without Verifier's Secret Keys 125 
probabilities of impersonation and substitution 
below. 
respectively, defined 
1-1) In the impersonation attack, U tries to create a fraudulent mdhenticated 
message that has not been legally yenemted by a signer S but will be 
accepted by a verifier V. Success probability of the impersonation attack 
is defined by 
Pn,Fr := max max Pr( V accepts 
eu (rn,cr) 0") I en)· 
where the probabihty is over mndom choices of Gen, and the ma:rimum 
is taken over: all possible user's 
ticated messages (m,O") E Af xI:. 
eu E Eu; and all possible authen-
1-2) In the substitution attack, after observing a valid authenticated message 
created by S, U trieB to create a fraud·ulent authenticated message that 
will be accepted by a 
attack is defined by 
V. Success probahility of the substitution. 
Pn.Ps := max max max max 
eu (m.,J) (m*.u*) (m',J')#(m,cr) 
Pr( V' accepts (m', 0" 1) I eu, (m, O"), (m*, O"*)), 
where the probability is over random choices of Gen, and the ma:rimum 
is token over: all possible ttser's keys t" E Eu; all possible authenticated 
messages (m, a), (m', c/) E Af xI: with (m, O") i= (m', 0"1); an.d all possible 
pairs of blinded messages and authenticators (m*, E M* x 2::*. 
Unconditional Undeniabil'ity. The notion of '!lTtconditional u.ndeniability 
means that it is ditfi1:ult for a dishonest signer S to create an il!Pqal authen-
ticated message such that a user U will accept it, but a veT'!fier V rejects it. 
The success probability of this attack denoted by Prr,D is defined as 
Prr,D max max max 
es rn"' (m,u) 
Pr(U accepts (m,O') 1\ V rejects (m,O") I e5 ,m*). 
J) Unconditional Blindness. The notion of unconditional bl-indness means 
that it is dij]icult for a dishonest signer S to obtain information on the orig-
inal me88age from its bl,inded message. The s'uccess probability of this attack 
denoted by Prr,B is defined as 
Pn,B := n~';' ~ll;.X { 2:: I Pr(mles,m*)- Pr(rn) I}· 
mE1VI 
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A direct construction of EA-codes is given in [4], and we describe it as follows. 
1. Key Generation Algorithm, Gen: For a l:lecmity parameter 111 , it se-
lects a prime powtcr q with bit length p, and constructs the finite field GF(q) 
with (/ elements. It also chooses a pol_n10mial C'.::x(z) := z +a by picking 
a E GF(q) uniformly at random. In addition, it chooses uniformly at ran-
dum a polynomial :c) := L.7=o'i'.J=o9ijYiZj E GF(ql . It also selects 
Vu. L'v E GF(q) at random. Then, it outputs e8 := G(y, z). 
ev := .. : ), I'"' CoJz)) and e,. := ( G( Vv, Cn(z)), Vv ). In the following, we 
assume that all messagec; are encoded as elements in GF(q). 
2. Blinding Algorithm, Blind: For a message m E GF(q) and e11 , it com-
putes m*:= C"'(m)(= m+ . and then, outputs rn'. 
3. Signing Algorithm, Sign: For a blinded message m* E GF(q) and e8 • it 
compute;,; j3(y) := G(y, m*), and then outputs CJ* := f3(y). 
4. Unblinding Algorithm, Unblind: Let CJ := CJ*. Then it outputs CJ. 
5. Verification Algorithm, UVer: For an authenticated message (m, CJ) and 
a user's secret key eu, it outputs true if f3(vu) = G(vu, C"'(m)) holds, and 
otherwise out}nit;,; false. 
6. Verification Algorithm, VVer: For an authenticated message (m. CJ) and 
a verifier's secret key e,. it outputs true if p(vv) = G(v, .. Ca(m)) holds, and 
otherwise outputs 
It is easily seen that the above construction of I3A-codes meet the correctness 
condition, i.e., for all possible eu E Eu, e, E 
that 
, ev E Ev and m E lvf, it holds 
UVer(m, Unblind(Sign.(Blind(m, eu), e3 ). 
VVer(m, Unblind(Sign(Blind(m, e,), e3 L 
'eu) =true, 
. ev) =true. 
Moreover, the 
proposition. 
of the above construction follows from the following 
PROPOSITION 9 ( [4]). The above construction of EA-codes is %-secur-e. 
3. Blind Authentication Code in the Manual Channel Model 
In this section. propose a EA-code in the ~ICM in which the number of 
entities having secret keys is smaller than that of the 13A-code [4]. 
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3.1. Model and Security Definition 
vVe propoc;c a model of information-theoretically secure BA-codes in the 1\IC::\L 
Our model is similar to that of BA-codes [4]: however, a Yerificr does not need to 
have his secret key in our model. Therefore, it enables a user to arbitrarily select a 
Ycrifier during the protocol (i.e., a verifier is not neces;,;arily determined in advance). 
In addition, we as;,;ume that a signer does not perform the deniable attack, while 
it is considered in the security of BA-codes in Section 2.3. The reason is explained 
in Remark 12. Furthermore, we consider the one-time model of BA-codes in the 
MCM as well as that of BA-codes. In the following, we propo:oe a model and cl 
security definition of BA-codes in the 1\ICM. 
In BA-codes in the MCM, there are four entities, TI, S, U, and V, which are 
the same as those in Definition 7. Informally. a BA-code in the MCJ\I is executed 
as follmvs. Tl generates secret keys on behalf of S and U. After distributing these 
secret keys w S and U over secure channels, respectively, TI deletes the keyti from 
his memory. Once being given a secret key from TI, for a rncs;,;agc rn, U generate;,; 
a blinded message m* by using his secret key. Then, U sends m* to S over an 
insecure channel. On receiving m* from U, S issues a receipt, and sends it back 
to U over an insecure channel. On receiving the receipt from S, U can select a 
verifier V aml he sends the message m and his secret key to V over an insecure 
channel. On receiving m. and a user's secret key. V asks S to send his secret 
and the Llinded message m: to V. On receiving a signer's :,;ecret key and m* from 
S by u:,;ing an A-code in the MCl'vi, V checks the validity of the message m by using 
all information received from U and S. Thus, a BA-code in the MCM utilizes an 
A-code in the MCM as a subprotocol. 
Formalh-, \Ve define a BA-code in the \IC'vi as follows. 
DEFI~ITJO)i 10. A blind authentication code in the manual channel m.odel 
(EA-code in the MCM) \[! involves fmLr entities, TI. S, U and V, and consi8ts of a 
thT'ee-Lu,ple of algor-ithms (Gen, Blind, Ver) with four .finite 8ets, M, 1\;/*, Es, and 
Eu, where all algoTithms except Gen are deterministic. \[! is executed with seven 
phases as jollo1Ds. 
Notation. 
- Entities: Tl, S, U, and V are the same as those in Definition 7. 
- Sets: AI, ]\J*, Es, and Eu are the same as tho8e in Definition 7. 
Alyor·dhms: Gcn is the same as that in Definition 7, Bhnd: 1\;1 x ---+ 
llr is a blinding alr;orithm, Ver: AI x lvl* x Ec' x --+ {true, false} 
is a verification algorithm executed b!J V. 
1. Key Generation and Distribution by TI. TI generates secret keys e8 E 
Es and eu E Eu forS and U, respectively, by using Gen. After distributing 
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these secret keys to S and U over secure channels, respectively, TI deletes the 
keys from his memory. S and U keep their secret keys secret, respectively. 
2. Blinding. For u message rn E Jvf, the user U genc:mtes a blinded mess!UJC 
m* : = Blind( m, eu) E AI* by using his key e,. Then, U sends m* to S. 
3. Receipt Issue S. On m* from U, the 
shmr that S has accepted the blinded message m*. 
to U. 
S issue., a receipt to 
S sends the 
4. Selecting Verifier and Data Transmission. U can select a verifier V 
(or a V may be selected ·in adt•uncc), and U transm·its rn and eu. to 
thr veTijier V. 
5. Transmission by the manual channel. On receiving m and eu from U, 
the V asks the sign.t:r 8 to send his secret key e8 and !.he bl·indcd 
message m*. .8 sends them to V by using an A-code in MC"'vf. 
6. Verification by V. On receiving e8 and m* from S, the verifier V verifies the 
validity m by eu, e8 , !Lnd m*. M on precisely. if Ver(m. rn*, e,, e8 ) 
true. thrn V and it otherurise. 
In the above definition, we require the correctness condition, i.e., for all possible 
e" E Eu, e, E Es and m lvf, it holds that 
Ver{m, Blind(m, e"), eu, e8 ) =true. 
Next, we define security of DA-codes in the MC:\1 as follows. 
DEFINili0\1 11. Let W be a EA-code in the MCJI. Then. 'V is said 
to be (n, .A, k, c, S)-secure, if the underly'ing A-code in the MCM is an uncon-
ditionally perfectly secure (n, .A, k, cl-a'Uthentication protocol and it holds that 
nmx{Pw,F: B}:::; 5, tchere Pw,F and Pw,B are defined as follows. 
1) Unconditional unforgeability. The notion of unconditional unforgeability 
mrans that it is diffic'ult for a dishonest user U to succeed in the substitution 
attack: creatine; a fraudulent message m1 for a calzd messaqc Tn. Succes~ 
probability of this attack is by 
P>I,,F := rnax 11,1':¥ rnax rnax 
m, "Yn y---rn f' u' rn* 
where the probability is over random choices of Gen, and the maximv:m is 
taken over: all possible messages m, m' E Jvl with m d:. m'; and all possible 
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user's srcret keys cui E Eu (it is not necessarily the case with eu # e ,/, t. , 
ev e,/ is possible); and all possible blinded messages m* E NI*. 
2) Unconditional blindness. The notion of unconditional blindne8s is the 
same as blindness in EA-codes. Success probability of this attack is defined 
by 
Pw,B := rnax mc;,x { L IPr(mles, m*)- Pr(m)l}, 
m 
mEJl 
where the pmbability is oveT r-andom choices of Gen, the summation is over 
all possible messages m E AI, and the maximum is taken over: all possible 
·s keys e8 E .: and all possible blinded messages m' E NI*. 
REMARK 12. In ouT we do not consider the attack by a dishonest 
against unconditional u.ndeniability in the security definition of EA-codes (see Def-
inition 8 ), since we cannot realize the security against this attack in principle, i.e., 
the setting of no verifier's key makes it impossible that a EA-code meets uncondi-
tional v.ndcniablity. Actually, if a signer is dishonest, he can control all infonnation 
which the user will send to a verifier. Therefore, the dishonest signeT succeeds in 
the attack unconditional undeniability u•ith probability one. }rom an aspect 
of applications, there would be sever-al situations that we can trust an authority 
corresponding to the signer in the real woTld. OuT schem.e can be applied in such 
situations. 
In in ouT rrwdel we do not consideT the impersonation attack a 
dishonest usrr in the sewrity definition of BA-codes (see 8). The rcoson 
is essentially the same as that in the A -code in the MCiVI. 
Note that our model of EA-codes in the MCM is simpler than that of TIA-codes 
in the TI model in Section 2.3. since we have assumed that the signer does not 
perform the deniable attack in our model: By the assumption, the user does not 
need authenticators of a rrwc;:mge and its corrcc-;ponding blinded message to check 
the validity of them; and our model of EA-codes in the MCM requires only the 
three-tuple of algorithms, while the model of EA-codes in the TI model requires 
the six-tuple of algorithms. 
3.2. Construction 
In this section, we propose a construction of EA-codes in the :VICM. The iden 
in our construction is to utilize the construction of commitment schemes [1]. Our 
construction of algorithms is given as follows. 
1. Key Generation Algorithm, Gen. For a security parameter P', it selects 
a power q with bit length f.L, and ronstructs the finitr firld GF(q) with 
q elements. Then, it chooses a, b, x 1 uniformly at random from GF( q) and 
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puts Yl = ax1 b. Then, it outputs ev := (a, b) and c5 := (x1, yl). In the 
following, we assume that messages are encoded as elements in G F ( q). 
2. Blinding Algorithm, Blind. For a me::;::;age m and a user's secret key e11 , 
it computes m* :=m -a. then outputs the blinded message m''. 
:3. A-code in the lVICM. In the phase of transmission by the manual channel. 
the sign er transmits a verifier *, e8 ), where e8 = , yl), by using the 
perfectly (n. A, k, c:)-secure A-code in the MCM with k = 3 in [81 (see Section 
2.2). 
4. Verification Algorithm, Yer. For a message m, a user's .~ecret key eu = 
(a, b), a signer's secret key e8 = (:r1 . yl), and a blinded message m*, it outputs 
true, if it holds that 
* ' m =m-:-a. 
and otherwise outputs false. 
(1) 
(2) 
It is easily seen that the above construction satisfies correctness. i.e., for all 
possible e" , es E Es and mE .ZVI, it holds that 
1 m*. eu, e8 ) = tru.c. 
The security of the above construction is shown as follows. 
THEOHE:\I n. The aborc construct·ion is (u. A. 3, f., 5)-sccure. where n 
l3log qj, A = I :2log ~ + log( 31 nl , e = 12l;g q, and 5 = i. 
PROOF. In the phase of transmission by the manual channel, we have used the 
perfectly (n, A, k, e)-secure A-code in the ::'viCM with k = 3 in [8]. Hence, n, A, f. are 
evaluated as the statement of the theorem. 
In the we will cYaluatc 5. Our construction of BA-codc:o except for 
the subprot.ocol of the A-code the MCM is based on construction of the com-
mitment scheme in [1]. Furthermore, by construction, it is seen that the security 
of concealing and binding in the commitment scheme corresponds to the security 
of unconditional blindnec;s and unconditional unforgeability of the BA-code, re-
spectively. First. we note that the construction of the commitment scheme in [1] 
meets perfectly concealing, c:nd hence we have Pcr;.B = 0 in our construction (see 
[1, Theorem -L 1]). Second, we shuw Pw ,F s; i. This fact straightforwardly follows 
from the security proof of binding in [1] (see [1, Theorem 4.2]). Thus, we have 
max{P\TI,F, Pw,B} s; ~- D 
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3.3. Extension 
3.3.1 Generic construction from commitment schemes 
In our con~truction of EA-codes in the MC~I. 'XC have used the construction of the 
commitment scheme in . since it meets good security condition, i.e., perfectly 
concealing. However, by the construction in Section 3.2, it is straightforwardly seen 
that any construction of commitment schemes can be applied in our construction, 
instead of the one in [1]. Therefore, we can obtain a generic construction of EA-
codes in the MCM, starting from unconditionally secure commitment schemes and 
A-codes in the MCM. In this case, the proof can be shown in a very 
similar vvav as that of Theorem 13, namely, the security of concealing and 
in the underlying commitment scheme corresponds to the of unconditional 
blindness and unconditional unforgeability of the EA-code, respectively. 
3.3.2 BA-codes in the noisy channel model and the bounded storage 
model 
In this pap0r, v;e focused on the manual channel model (MCJ\I) to realize a mech-
anism of EA-codes where no verifier's secret-key is required. The essential idea 
in our scheme lies in utilizing the A-code between the signer and the verifier with 
no shared secret in the phase of transmission by the manual channel in Definition 
10. Hovvevcr, we note that, instead of using the A-code in the ~·1CM in the phase. 
it is also pofisihle to use the A-code with no shared secrets in the noisy channel 
model [14] or the boundud storage model (ESM) [7]. Actually, by applying 
the key agreement in the NCM (resp., BSM) and the traditional A-code, we can 
construct the A-code in the NCl\I (resp., ESM). Therefore, we can also realize: 
• EA-code in the noisy channel model (NCM); and 
• EA-code in the the hounded storage model (ESM). 
The proofs of security of the BA-code in the KCM and ES~I can be shown 
essentially the same way as that of Theorem 13. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we propo.scd a formal model and security formalization for EA-
codes in the MCM. The advantage of our model over the traditional EA-codes 
is that a verifier does not have to hold a secret key and hence a user can arbitrarily 
select a verifier during the protocol execution. In addition, we presented a con-
struction of EA-codes in the MC:\1. Furthermore, we considered several extension: 
the EA-codes in the MG\1 could be constructed from any unconditionally secure 
commitmem scheme and A-code in the MCl\I in a generic 'Nay and that the EA-
codes in the noisy channel model and the ones in the the bounded storage model 
could also be obtained by using the similar idea in our construction. 
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Although we proposed the construction of BA-codes in the .i\IC:.VI in this paper, 
it is not shown what an optimal construction of EA-codes in the MCJ\I where 
the optimal construction mean" a construction satisfying the condition that the 
c;ize of secret keys of the u~cr and the signer being minimized. Therefore, it would 
be interesting to (lerive a tight lower bound on the size of the user's and the signer's 
secret kevc;, and to show an optimal construction which meet~ the lower bound with 
equality. 
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